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Abstract
We investigate the causal effect of financial literacy on financial assets, ex-
ploiting banks information policies for identification. In Italy, banks who belong
to the PattiChiari consortium have implemented policies aimed at increasing
transparency and procedural simplification. These policies may affect individ-
uals’ financial literacy without involving any direct cost for clients in terms of
time, effort or resources, as we show in the paper. We exploit confidential in-
formation on whether individuals have their main bank account in one bank in
the PattiChiari consortium to instrument their financial literacy level. We show
that these policies have a positive and significant effect on both knowledge of
financial instruments and household financial assets. Our results suggest that
banks information policies have the potential to be an effective tool to increase
individuals’ financial literacy and that the relationship between financial literacy
and wealth is largely underestimated by standard regression models.
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1 Introduction
The literature has recently emphasized the association between financial literacy or
numerical and mathematical ability, on the one hand, and risk diversification, retire-
ment savings, investment portfolios on the other.1 Both in Europe and in the US, there
is evidence of low levels of financial literacy which is reflected into limited knowledge
of economic concepts, like inflation or interest compounding (Jappelli, 2010). Lack
of financial literacy and the mis-perception of crucial economic factors may lead indi-
viduals to make suboptimal investment choices and, thus, reduce individual wealth.2
In addition, errors in expectations of future resources may reflect into inadequacy of
retirement savings (Bernheim, 1997; Hamermesh, 1984). Understanding the link be-
tween financial literacy and wealth is particularly important nowadays. Indeed, in the
last decades, many European countries introduced reforms of the pension public pro-
vision system (e.g. increasing retirement age, shifting PAYGo to funded and changing
the traditional defined-benefit (DB) contribution schemes into defined-contribution
(DC) pensions). These reforms shift the burden of many decisions about financing
retirement away from institutions toward individuals and thus determine a greater
responsibility for workers in the accumulation of adequate retirement wealth.
The observed positive association between financial literacy and wealth may not be
causal. The recent paper by Jappelli and Padula (2011) provides a theoretical study
on the role of financial literacy extending the standard model of inter-temporal choices
by including the choice of investing in financial literacy. According to their model,
financial literacy is costly, in terms of both time and money expenditure, but allows
consumers to access better investment opportunity and, thus, to increase the expected
value of their investments’ return. Jappelli and Padula (2011) stress that financial
literacy is endogenous in the saving equation, an issue that has so far been almost
neglected in the literature.3
The aim of the paper is twofold. First, we investigate the role played by financial
institutions, like banks, in determining individual understanding of financial instru-
ments. This may be significantly affected by the “information policy” of banks: for
1See for instance Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011), Fornero and Monticone (2011), Guiso and
Jappelli (2008), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007),van Rooij et al. (2011).
2See Fornero et al. (2011), Christelis and Padula (2010), van Rooij et al. (2011), Lusardi and
Mitchell (2007).
3Exceptions are the recent papers by Disney and Gathergood (2011), van Rooij et al. (2011),
Drexler and Schoar (2010), and Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011).
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instance policies aimed at increasing transparency and procedural simplification may
reduce the cost of acquiring financial information for the clients thereby improving
their financial literacy. If banks engage in actions and establish rules aimed at in-
creasing transparency and at simplifying the relationships with the client, the amount
of financial literacy gained by the client will be higher without involving any direct
cost for clients in terms of time, effort or resources. Second, we use the variation in
financial literacy induced by banks’ information policies to assess the causal effect of
financial literacy on household financial assets.
To investigate the impact of banks’ information policies on financial literacy we
exploit a peculiar feature of the Italian banks’ market. Since 2003, a large number
of banks (around one hundred of them, corresponding to almost 75% of all national
branches) implemented a self-regulation system called PattiChiari. This system is
aimed at increasing transparency in the relationship with the client. Banks belonging
to PattiChiari undertake several commitments in order to guarantee transparency
and comparability of financial products and to offer simple tools to clearly understand
sophisticated financial instruments. These commitments include providing information
about mortgages and debts, and comparability of current accounts.
We use a nationally representative sample of Italian households (the Survey of
Household Income and Wealth - SHIW, henceforth) for which we observe the bank
where they hold their current accounts, the financial literacy of the household head, and
the total financial assets. Financial literacy is measured with three questions regarding
the knowledge of compound interest rates, inflation, and portfolio diversification. We
use the information on whether household current main bank is a PattiChiari member
to instrument the financial literacy of the household head.
We find that having a current account in a PattiChiari bank increases by 0.3 the
number correct answers on financial literacy (about 16% of the average number of
correct answers) and we can rule out that our instrument is weak. We also look at the
effect of our instrumental variable on household financial assets. Our results suggest
that a being a PattiChiari client yields an increase of household financial assets of
4.900 euros (about 25% of average wealth observed in the sample).
Banks’ information policies may provide a valid instrument for financial literacy
in the saving equation if the two following assumptions are not violated. First, bank
information policy must not affect consumers’ choice of banks; second, banks belonging
to the PattiChiari consortium must not differ systematically in elements that may
3
affect wealth (apart from information policies). We are able to provide evidence on
both assumptions.
Our results suggest that the relationship between financial literacy and wealth is
largely underestimated by standard regression models. In addition, our findings point
to large unintended consequences of banks’ information policies on individuals’ finan-
cial literacy. This channel did not receive much attention in the literature but may
play a relevant role in shaping individual financial knowledge (and, thus, it may have
an impact on household finances and welfare). From a policy perspective, bank’s in-
formation policy may represent a cheap way to improve individual financial literacy
among adults. Several institutions, such as the OECD, the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment and the Bank of Italy, have recently expressed the need for improved financial
knowledge among European and US citizens, emphasizing the role of formal financial
education in schools or at the workplace. Transparency and procedural simplification
policies may represent complementary instruments that may foster the effectiveness of
these educational interventions.
Finally, we can provide some preliminary evidence on the channels through which
the effect takes place. More specifically, we investigate whether this relationship is due
to a better ability to planning, i.e. if literate respondents are more prone to save and
to save for retirement, or whether literate respondents are more prone to participate
to the stock market. Our findings suggest that both these channels are relevant.
2 Related Literature
Our paper relates to the recent literature that studies the relationship between financial
literacy and household wealth. In this brief review, we will restrict our attention to
the papers most closely related to our contribution, namely those who acknowledge
the potential endogeneity of financial literacy in the household wealth equation.
The recent paper by Jappelli and Padula (2011) provides a theoretical study on
the role of financial literacy extending the standard model of inter-temporal choices
by including the choice of investing in financial literacy. According to their model,
financial literacy is costly, in terms of both time and money expenditure, but allows
consumers to access better investment opportunity and, thus, to increase the expected
value of their investments’ return. They stress that financial literacy is endogenous in
the saving equation, an issue that has so far received little attention in the literature.
4
The same reasoning can be applied to other outcome variables, like wealth, stock
market participation, planning for retirement, etc. For this reason, most recent papers
have tried to develop an instrumental variable approach to elicit the causal effect of
financial literacy on financial behavior of individuals and households. However, finding
an exogenous source of variability in financial literacy is extremely complicated and
most of the identification strategies adopted in observational studies so far are not free
from criticism.
van Rooij et al. (2011) look at the relationship between financial literacy and wealth
accumulation and use information on individuals’ education in economics before labour
market entry as an instrument for financial literacy. The authors’ themselves are skep-
tical about the validity of the exclusion restriction for this instrumental variable and
discuss the issue at length in the paper, adding a rich set of controls to their baseline
specification. They find evidence of a strong positive association between financial
literacy and wealth accumulation, particularly when focusing on what they call “ad-
vanced financial literacy” 4 and show that this association is neither affected by the
inclusion of measures of individuals’ confidence in their financial knowledge or their
risk attitude -which conversely are important determinants of wealth accumulation-
nor by the inclusion of proxies for individuals’ carefulness, propensity to save, individ-
uals’ self control nor by the inclusions of individuals’ expectations of longevity, income
uncertainty, household prices, replacement rate. With this strategy applied to data
from the Netherlands, the authors’ find IV estimates that are generally three times
larger in magnitude that the OLS estimates. The results remain fairly similar when the
authors use the financial knowledge of relatives (siblings and parents) as instruments
for individual financial literacy. The idea underlying the choice of the instrumental
variable is that individuals are influenced by their peers or reference group but can-
not influence the peers’ experience significantly. This assumes no ‘reflection problem’
(Manski, 1993).
Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011), Fornero and Monticone (2011), Disney and
Gathergood (2011) propose instrumental variable strategies similar to the one proposed
by van Rooij et al. (2011), i.e. either using proxies or direct measures of financial
knowledge of the relevant peer or reference group or using individual education in
4van Rooij et al. (2011)(p.15) “While the basic financial literacy index touches upon skills that
individuals need on a daily basis, the advanced literacy index includes questions on the workings
of stocks, bonds and mutual funds, which are complex concepts beyond what is needed to know to
perform basic financial transactions”.
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economics in the past. In their study on Germany, Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011)
consider exposure to financial knowledge of others in the same region or financial
literacy of the parents. The authors do not measure financial knowledge of others in
the same region directly but use a quite crude proxy, namely political attitudes at
the regional level, relying on previous evidence by Kaustia and Torstila (2010) that
suggest an important role for political attitude in financial decision making. They find
evidence of a positive association between financial literacy and retirement planning5
and the magnitude of this is between three and thirteen times larger when they rely
on the IV strategy, depending on the specification.6 Fornero and Monticone (2011)
exploit information on whether individuals in the same household of the respondent
have a degree in economics or use a computer as instrument for financial literacy in
the equation for pension funds participation in Italy. Similar to previous studies, their
results suggest that simple associations underestimate the marginal effect of financial
literacy by six to ten times, depending on the specification. Disney and Gathergood
(2011) investigate the relationship between financial literacy and net worth as well as
consumer credit. The instrument they use for financial literacy is the share of time
devoted to financial education whilst in full-time education, as a proxy of pre-labour
market entry endowment in financial literacy. The OLS coefficient of financial literacy
on wealth is biased downward, but it is very close to the IV coefficient.
A more convincing instrumental variable strategy is proposed by Lusardi and Mitchell
(2011b). They take advantage of the fact that several US states mandated high school
financial education in the past and exploit the exogenous variation in financial literacy
induced by the exposure to the mandate to identify the effect of financial literacy on
the propensity to plan for retirement in the US. Their results support previous evi-
dence: the OLS estimate of the impact of financial literacy is biased downward and
the marginal effect increases about five times using the IV strategies.
5Retirement planning captures whether respondents tried to find out how much they should save
to reach a certain standard of living in retirement.
6Notice that the identification strategy relies on the idea that the political attitudes of sampled
individuals are not affected by those of the population in the region. However, there are two arguments
against this claim: first, from an economic point of view, social interactions in political attitudes may
be present; second, from a statistical point of view, any (observed or unobserved) characteristic of
the sampled individuals is an unbiased estimate of the regional mean of that characteristic. Hence,
political attitudes measured at the regional level are a proxy of those of the sampled individuals. This
strategy thus relies on the assumption that unobserved variables driving the endogeneity are averaged
out once aggregated at the regional level, while they operate at the individual level. Whether this
claim is true, is not obvious.
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This paper contributes to the literature by providing a new strategy (as discussed in
more details in Section 4) to identify the causal effect of financial knowledge on financial
assets, and by highlighting the role of information policies in fostering financial literacy.
3 The PattiChiari consortium
Since 2003, the Italian Banking Association (Associazione Bancaria Italiana: ABI,
henceforth) has created the PattiChiari consortium. The aims of PattiChiari are
twofold: to foster banking transparency and to enhance financial education of Italian
households. For what regards the former, a bank that joins the consortium must in-
troduce a set of tools (so called “Impegni per la qualita`”, i.e. “Quality Commitments”)
that refer to four areas: 1) information about mortgage and debt; 2) comparability of
current accounts; 3) safety of home banking and payment cards; and 4) transferability
of financial services across banks.7 Since 2010, a set of regulatory interventions have
extended commitments 3) and 4) to all Italian banks, so that only the first two com-
mitments are now peculiar of the consortium. Financial education has been fostered
indirectly, by providing easy-to-read banking statements and extensive customer-care
aimed at clarifying the functioning of financial tools and services, and directly, by
promoting partnerships with trade associations and financial training initiatives at the
local level in all areas where at least one PattiChiari bank is present.8
The number of banks that joined the consortium has increased overtime: currently
98 banks belong to it, corresponding to around 75% of all bank branches in the Italian
territory. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the share of bank branches belonging
to PattiChiari at the province level in 2006, 2008, and 2010. It is clear that the
distribution of the share is not homogeneous over the territory. Notably, the North-
Eastern regions of Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, and Veneto have very
7More in details, the cost of closing a current account is fixed and known in advance by clients;
costumers can switch to other banks and automatically transfer to the new bank information about
financial investments, mortgages, loans and credits (transferability). Clients receive periodical state-
ments about interest paid on mortgages (information about debts). Home banking and cash drawings
are protected by double authentication systems; banks provide information about the cost of cash
drawings and about the spread of cash dispenser (safety). Finally, comparability of the cost and
the interest rate yielded by current accounts is guarantee by a search engine that provides the client
with updated information (comparability). Optional commitments concerns provision of synthetic
information when closing a current account and assistance to self-employed asking for a loan.
8Note, however, that direct interventions are typically targeted at young individuals enrolled in
school at the time of the intervention while our analysis looks at household wealth of individuals who
are already financially independent from the family of origin and typically not enrolled in school.
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few PattiChiari branches. This is mostly because of the diffusion of cooperative banks
in those regions: no cooperative bank belongs to PattiChiari.
4 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in assessing the causal effect of financial literacy of the head of
household i at time t in province p (flipt) on the financial assets of the same household
at the same point in time and space (wipt). The household head is defined as the
household member who his responsible for economic and financial decision and is the
only household member for which we observe financial literacy. Equation (1) below
describes the empirical model we consider.
wipt = α˜ + β˜f lipt +Xiptγ˜ + λpt + εipt (1)
Xipt is a vector of individual-level observable characteristics. We experimented with
several subsets of these controls.9
Equation (1) allows for time specific province effects λpt unobserved characteristics
which may correlate with both financial literacy and the outcome variable. These
regressors capture differences in the levels of financial literacy, wealth, and economic
activity across provinces within Italy without restricting these factors to have a con-
stant effect in different periods.
The existence of individual unobserved heterogeneity may still substantially bias
the estimate of β. In addition, causal identification of the effect of financial literacy
on wealth accumulation may be hampered by reverse causality: individual wealth
may affect the incentive to increase financial education both through a change in the
opportunity-cost of time and through a change in the relative benefit from knowing
how financial tools work.
With panel data, one could consider including individual fixed effect in equation (1).
There are three main arguments that prevent the use of individual fixed effects to
address these issues. First, both financial assets and financial literacy are highly stable
over the restricted sample period in which we observed them. Second, respondents can
learn from previous interviews. Thus, the variation in the number of correct answers
9In the baseline specification Xipt includes gender of the household head, a second-order polynomial
in age, household size, marital status, size of the municipality (3 categories: 20,000-40,000; 40,000-
500,000; more than 500,000 inhabitants). The inclusion of other covariates is discussed in Section
5.
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for those who are interviewed more than once may capture learning of specific answers,
instead of the overall level of financial literacy.10 Third, using the longitudinal sample
would reduce sample size because of attrition.
To solve both omitted variable and reverse causality issues, we pursue an instru-
mental variable approach. We use information about whether the household’s bank
account is in a PattiChiari bank or not to predict the actual level of financial literacy
of the household head. In the baseline model, we consider only the main bank account
(as identified by the household), among the robustness checks we will consider even
other bank accounts owned by the household. We control for possibly endogenous
changes in the availability of PattiChiari branches over the Italian territory by focus-
ing on intra-provincial (and even intra-municipal; see results in the robustness checks
section) variability among households who are clients of a PattiChiari bank.
The first-stage equation corresponding to the model in equation (1) is presented in
equation (2).
flipt = α˜0 + α˜1pcipt +Xiptα˜2 + λpt + ν˜ipt (2)
where our instrumental variable pcipt is a dummy equal to 1 if the main current account
owned by the household is in a bank belonging to the PattiChiari consortium and the
other included regressors coincide with those considered in equation (1).11
Our strategy relies on two identification hypotheses. First, banks belonging to the
PattiChiari consortium must not be systematically different with respect to banks that
do not belong to it in any characteristics (apart from information policies) that may
affect household wealth. Second, individuals must not self-select as clients of a specific
bank according to the bank information policy but rather depending on other relevant
variables - such as the distance between the bank and their residence - which do not
directly affect their financial literacy or wealth, conditional on province of residence, in
any specific time-period. If clients choose their banks based on different criteria (like
distance from home or advertisements)12 and affiliation to PattiChiari is not correlated
10See Section 5 for a discussion of the relevance of this channel.
11Among the robustness checks we considered different definitions of the instruments, such as
whether all or at least one of the current accounts are in PattiChiari banks. Results discussed in
Section 6 are robust to these different choices.
12The location is shown to be the most important criterion in bank selection decision (Dupuy and
Kehoe, 1976; Phuong Ta and Yin Har, 2000).
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with any confounding factor that may directly affect wealth, then information policies
might induce exogenous changes in individual financial literacy.
These two assumptions are only partly testable on the basis of the data at our hands,
but they deserve a careful discussion. We first provide complementary evidence show-
ing that: a) PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks do not differ with respect to
policies that may affect household wealth accumulation13 in a way that explains our
results; b) cost and information policies are not the main reasons for choosing a bank.
We collected information from a nationally representative sample of bank accounts,
administered by the Bank of Italy’s Banking and Financial Supervision Area. Among
the 8233 bank accounts surveyed, we distinguish those belonging and not belonging
to a PattiChiari bank. Descriptive statistics on costs charged by the two categories of
banks are reported in Table 1, together with a Welch test on equality between means
of the two groups. The variables analysed describe heterogeneity in fees charged on
bank clients and, in addition, may reflect structural differences in policies implemented
by different types of bank. Basic fees for bank accounts as well as average cost of
bank transfers for clients of PattiChiari banks are usually significantly higher than
those charged to the clients of non-PattiChiari banks. Conversely, the yearly fees
charged for Bancomat and credit cards are statistically lower for clients of PattiChiari
banks. Albeit statistically significant, all these differences between PattiChiari and
non- PattiChiari banks are in general rather small ranging between nearly four euros
per year charge increase for basic account services to a two euro reduction in the fee
for debit and credit card. Note that considering only fixed fees (column 1 to 3 in Table
1) the differences would sum to zero. All in all, it is unlikely for these differences to
be the main driver of our results and there is no evidence of structural differences in
policies implemented by PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks.
In addition, banks that belong to the PattiChiari consortium may differ from the
other banks with respect to credit rationing and mortgage policies that, in turn, af-
fect household wealth through the cost of debit. To check whether PattiChiari and
non-PattiChiari banks systematically differ with respect to credit policies, we rely on
information about liquidity constraints and mortgage provided by SHIW.14 The first
column of Table 2 reports the correlation between the PattiChiari dummy and the
13We consider the annual price for bank accounts and fees charged to banking operations, the
availability of credit or the interest rate charged on loans.
14A caveat is due to the fact that this information reflects the equilibrium between supply and
demand.
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probability that the respondents is liquidity constrained, which may signal differences
in credit rationing. Following Jappelli et al. (1998), we consider liquidity constrained
those households that either: a) applied to a bank or a financial company to ask for a
loan or a mortgage and the application was rejected; or b) answer positively to the fol-
lowing question “In [year] did you or any other member of your household consider the
possibility of applying to a bank or a financial company for a loan or a mortgage but
then change your mind thinking that the application would be rejected?”. We do not
find evidence of any correlation between being PattiChiari client and being liquidity
constrained (see Table 2) at standard significance levels. To investigate the existence
of differences in credit policies between PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks we fo-
cus on a particular type of credit, i.e the mortgage for the purchase of the dwelling.
The second column of Table 2 reports estimate results for the probability of having
a fixed-rate-mortgage (FRM) vis-a`-vis an adjustable-rate-mortgage (ARM), while the
third and fourth columns shows the correlation between the PattiChiari dummy and
the interest rate level for FRM (third column) and ARM (last column). The coefficient
associated to the variable ‘Client of PattiChiari” is not significant in any regression of
Table 2.
Figure 2 supports the validity of the second assumption, i.e. that cost and informa-
tion policies are not important reasons for choosing a bank. It plots the distribution
of household’s reasons for choosing the main bank: convenience, economic reasons,
type of bank.15 We distinguish between clients of a PattiChiari/non-PattiChiari bank
(upper panel) and between households who changed their bank/remained client of the
same bank in the last two years (lower panel).16 By large, the main reason for choosing
a bank is related to convenience, that is the only determinant for 63% of PattiChiari
clients and for 67% of other respondents, while financial conditions are the only deter-
minant for less than 15% of the respondents in each subgroup. If anything, financial
15More in details, the respondent is asked the question“Why did you choose [the bank you use more
often] when you and your household first began using it?” and can give at most two answers choosen
between 13 alternatives. We these alternatives into three broad groups - i.e. convenience (convenience
to home/work, respondent’s employer’s bank (or respondent’s business’s bank)), financial/economic
reasons (favourable interest rates, speed of transaction execution, range of services, low fees for
services, possibility of online banking) and bank type (it is a well-known, important bank, staff
courtesy). The figure plots the percentage of respondents who choose only one alternative, two
alternatives in the same group or two alternatives in different categories.
16More in details, we isolate four types of clients: clients who changed their main bank, either
moving to a PattiChiari bank (to PC ) or to another bank (to non-PC ), and households who remain
clients of a bank that belongs (No switch (PC)) or not (No switch (non PC)) to the PattiChiari
consortium.
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conditions are valued more by clients of banks that are not in the consortium. Similar
patterns are observed across the four categories in the lower panel, where financial
conditions are choosen more often by clients who remain clients or move to a Pat-
tiChiari bank. Table 3 show the results of the conditional correlation between the
reason for choosing a bank and the probability of being client of a bank that belong
to the PattiChiari consortium (probit estimate). In the first column we include as
regressors dummies for the 9 categories; in the second and the third one we use two
dummies that capture, respectively, if the respondent picks only financial reasons or at
least one financial reason. The table shows a correlation between the determinants of
bank’s choice and the probability of using a PattiChiari bank, but, in line with bivari-
ate correlation, clients of PattiChiari banks value less economic condition and bank’s
product supply. This channel is, thus, unlikely to determine a positive correlation be-
tween wealth and the instrument. To further address this potential issue, in addition,
we will control for the reasons for choosing the bank in the empirical analysis: as we
will discuss more in details in Section 5, we cannot reject the assumption that they
are significant in the financial assets equation, but they do not affect the significance
and the magnitude of other coefficients, in particular the IV results -notably the first
stage and ITT- are unaffected by the inclusion of these controls, while precision of the
estimates is improved.
Exclusion restrictions are violated if the commitments taken by PattiChiari branches
(see section 3) affect the returns to financial investment because they contribute to
decrease the risk of investments. Since clients have to choose or agree upon a proposed
portfolio allocation and PattiChiari branches cannot influence the real risk of a partic-
ular asset available on the market, we view this as an indirect effect of PattiChiari that
only operates through its effect on individuals’ financial literacy rather than directly.
PattiChiari and non-PattiChiari banks may also differ in the ability to segment
the supply of financial products. If PattiChiari banks are more able to discriminate
customers, they may charge worse financial conditions to illiterate clients. In this
case, the PattiChiari variable, may not capture the impact of information policies
but the effect of higher asset returns (or, equivalently, lower cost of borrowing or
buying financial products). This may be an issue if PattiChiari and nonPattiChiari
banks also differ with respect to unobservables that are correlated with the ability to
discriminate (“relational” Vs “market oriented” model). Assuming that this difference
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is stable within province (and eventually varies overtime), we can account for this
within our framework.
Finally, we exploit panel data to construct a set of instruments (based on the in-
formation of individuals who ’switch’ between banks in or our the PattiChiari con-
sortium) and perform an overidentification test (computing the Hansen J statistics)
for the exogeneity of our instrument (see Section 6). We find evidence supporting the
exogeneity of our instrument (i.e. being client of a PattiChiari bank) in the financial
assets equation.
4.1 Data
We use data from the Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a
biannual survey that collects a large set of information concerning household income,
savings, financial portfolios, and wealth from a nationally representative sample of
Italian households. The empirical analysis relies on the 2010 wave.17
The 2010 wave includes specific questions to measure the financial literacy of the
household head. They relate to basic financial literacy concepts, like portfolio di-
versification, the risk associated to fixed or adjustable interest rate and the effect of
inflation.18 We measure financial literacy with the number of questions that the house-
hold head answered correctly. Table 4 shows that almost three out of four respondents
answered correctly to the question on inflation; the percentage of correct answers to
17Baseline analysis are based on the 2010 wave, since questions about the reasons for choosing the
bank are available only in this year. In Section 6, we check the validity of the results in a larger
sample, that also includes 2006 and 2008 waves (questions about financial literacy were not asked
before): results are qualitatively and quantitatively consistent.
18The first and the third one are similar to the ones devised for the US Health and Retirement
Study (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011a) while the second one is not included in the HRS. Specifically,
the three questions used in the analysis are:
• Understanding inflation. Imagine leaving 1,000 euros in a current account that pays 1% interest
and has no charges. Imagine also that inflation is running at 2%. Do you think that if you
withdraw the money in a year’s time you will be able to buy the same amount of goods as if
you spent the 1,000 euros today? Yes/No, I will be able to buy less (correct answer)/No, I will
be able to buy more/Do not know
• Understanding mortgages. Which of the following types of mortgage do you think will al-
low you from the very start to fix the maximum amount and number of installments to be
paid before the debt is extinguished? Floating rate mortgage/Fixed rate mortgage (correct
answer)/Floating rate mortgage with fixed installments/Do not know
• Portfolio diversification. Which of the following investment strategies do you think entails
the greatest risk of losing your capital? Investing in the shares of a single company (correct
answer) / Investing in the shares of more than one company/Do not know/No answer
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the question on mortgages is 64%; the question on portfolio diversification has been
answered correctly by 55% of the household heads. On average respondents answered
correctly to less than two questions, and one respondent out of three correctly answered
to all questions.
Household financial assets is elicited by the SHIW questionnaire. It is defined as
the sum of deposits, securities, and commercial credits.
The Italian Bank Association (ABI) has provided us with the date of entrance and
exit of each Italian banking group in the PattiChiari consortium. We use this informa-
tion, together with the answer to questions about the banks used by the household, to
build a variable that capture whether the household is client of a bank that is part of
the PattiChiari consortium. Our baseline analysis rely on a dummy (pc) that is equal
to one if the main bank used by the respondent belong to the consortium and zero if
it does not: 73% of respondents in our sample are clients of a bank that belongs to
PattiChiari consortium (Table 4). Alternatively, in the robustness section, we consider
different definitions of this dummy: pc nobnk includes among non-PattiChiari clients
those households that do not have any bank account; variables pc all and pc atleast
are equal to 1 if, respectively, all bank accounts and at least one bank account are in
a PattiChiari bank.
The unit of analysis is the household. After excluding from our sample outliers (the
upper and lower 5% tails of the financial assets distribution) and respondents who do
not report the reason for choosing the bank, the final sample size is 4972 observations
(descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4).
5 Findings
In this section, we present our baseline results.
First, we discuss estimates of the effect of having the main current account in
a PattiChiari bank on financial literacy (the First-Stage effect) and financial assets
accumulation (corresponding to the Intention-To-Treat effect). These estimates are
interesting per se since they document potentially unintended consequences of bank’s
information policies. Second, we combine these estimates to assess the effect of finan-
cial literacy on financial assets accumulation.
Table 5 and 6 show estimated effect of financial literacy on financial assets con-
trolling and not controlling for motivations for choosing the bank. Tables report the
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estimates of the association between assets and financial literacy (OLS column), the
causal effect of having a current account in a PattiChiari bank on financial assets (ITT
column) and financial literacy (FS column) and the causal effect of financial literacy
on financial assets (IV column). In all the following regressions, estimated standard
errors are robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the province level,
the largest level at which we have enough clusters (103) to obtain consistent estimates
of the second moment of the parameters (Moulton, 1990). The inspection of the two
tables shows that the inclusion of motivations among the regressors do not alter sig-
nificantly the point estimates of the PattiChiari dummy and of the key variables of
interest.
Our comments are based on results reported in Table 6, that is our preferred spec-
ification. The association between financial literacy and financial assets is positive:
our estimates suggest that one more correct answer is associated with an increase in
financial assets by almost 4 thousand euros. As discussed in Section 4, this estimate
is unlikely to reflect a causal relationship but represent an important benchmark for
our analysis. Notably, the strength of the association we measure is very similar to
those found in previous studies, albeit the measure of financial literacy used here and
by other authors differs.
We now turn to the analysis of the link between banks’ information policies, fi-
nancial literacy and financial assets. The second column (FS) reports the estimate of
the effect of having the main bank account in PattiChiari bank on financial literacy:
the instrument is not weak (the F-test on excluded instruments is 58) and positively
correlated with the financial literacy. The point estimate suggests that being a client
of a PattiChiari bank has the potential to allow one individual to give 0.3 additional
correct answers (+ 15% with respect to the average number of correct answers given
in the sample).
The third column (ITT) reports the coefficient of the dummy signaling that the
household has its main current account in a PattiChiari bank in the financial assets
equation. As long as the exclusion restriction of the instrument holds, this coefficient
can be considered an unbiased estimate of the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. The
effect is positive and significant: having the main current account in a PattiChiari
bank raises household financial assets by about 5 thousand euros, roughly one fourth
of the average value of assets in our sample. Other regressors have the expected sign
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(Table 6): financial assets are increasing and concave in age and household size and
they are greater for married couples and households with male household head.
In each specification, the fourth column (IV) provides the 2SLS estimates of the
effect of financial literacy on financial assets. The estimates are larger that what simple
association suggests. On average, one additional correct answer provided, conditional
on other covariates, leads to an increase of household assets of 17 thousand euros; the
corresponding association is generally around 4 times lower. These results are in line
with previous empirical analyses. van Rooij et al. (2011) show that the IV estimate
of the effect of financial literacy on wealth is almost three times that predicted by the
OLS, while our findings show the marginal effect estimated by IV to be much almost
5 times larger with respect to the OLS one.
A final note for the results on the motivations given for choosing the bank where
the household has its current account. Apart from the spurious OLS correlations,
the results signal that individuals choosing a bank for its service have in general a
higher financial literacy. This result is somehow straightforward (those who are more
financially literate value financial services more), and must be related with the results
of Table 3 showing that are on average respondents who choose a bank for its financial
services are less likely to be PattiChiari client. If anything, this possible selection
effect should bias our first stage estimate of being a PattiChiari client downwardly.
6 Robustness and Extensions
We now test the robustness of our findings to several alternative definitions of the
sample and alternative measures of our key regressors (financial literacy, and being a
PattiChiari bank client) and provide some extensions to our analysis.
As discussed in Section 4, our identification strategy is based on the assumption
that the choice of the bank is not correlated with factors that may affect wealth.
Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) find that the level of trust in institution and financial
advisors may affect individual investment decision and, thus, their wealth. If respon-
dents with a higher level of trust are also more likely to choose a bank in the PattiChiari
consortium because of its commitments to transparency and clarity, the coefficients
in the previous tables may be upwardly biased. To check whether this is the case in
our sample, we include proxies for trust among the controls. We exploit two different
sources of information: survey respondents in SHIW are interviewed about trust in
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their main bank and about the length of the relationship with their main bank. We
exploit answers to each of these questions in turn, in our analysis. In the first panel of
Table 7 we add a dummy that captures whether the respondent trusts his/her main
bank.19 The table shows that trust is not significant and the results are similar to the
baseline specification. In the second panel of Table 7 we control for the length of the
relationship between the client and the bank: we expect a longer relationship to reflect
higher trust in the bank. This variable increases the level of financial assets (ITT and
IV) but does not significantly affect financial literacy; the effect of financial knowledge
and of the instrument are not sensible to the inclusion of either of these additional
controls.
We also run the regressions controlling for the education level of the household
head (years of education): results are reported in the third panel of Table 7. We find
evidence of a non-trivial interaction between financial literacy and education.20 When
we control for education, the effect of being a PattiChiari client on financial literacy
remains relatively stable with respect to the baseline specification21, while the effect of
our instrument on the level of financial assets is reduced by nearly 44%. Our qualitative
findings on the causal effect of financial literacy on financial assets are confirmed also in
this case, but the resulting magnitude of the effect is smaller (by nearly 27%) since the
instrumental variable estimate moves from about 16.7 to 12.2 thousand euros. These
results have to be interpreted with caution because also education may be endogenous
in the wealth equation and we do not address this endogeneity problem here.
We checked the robustness of our findings to different measures of financial literacy.
First, we define a dummy equal to 1 if all three questions have been answered correctly.
Second, we consider each question separately. Results reported in Table 8 show that
being a PattiChiari client is strongly correlated with all these definitions, and the
causal effect is found to be highly significant and positive in all four cases. In addition,
we considered alternative different measures of the instrumental variable as well: we
included households not having any current accounts as part of the control group,
and we created dummies equal to 1 if all or at least one current account belong to a
19The dummy is equal to one if the answer is above the median (8 in a scale between 0 and 10).
Similar results are obtained if we set it equal to one if the answer is above 5.
20The education level of the household head affects financial literacy in the first stage equation
21The first stage effect changes from 0.296 to 0.229.
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PattiChiari bank. Results are qualitatively similar to our baseline specification (see
Table 9).22
A possible concern refers to the timing of the effect of the treatment (i.e. being
client of a bank that belongs to the consortium). To address the robustness of the
results to this issue, we exploit the panel component of the sample and we estimate
the effect of being exposed to bank information policy in 2008 or in 2006. Results
confirm our main findings (see Table A-2 in the Appendix).
Previous specifications are robust to the existence of province fixed effect. But
municipality-specific factors may drive both the level of wealth and the probability of
being client of a PattiChiari bank (e.g. if different banks decide to open branches in
particular type of municipality). We include municipality-fixed effects and replicate
our baseline results: previous findings are confirmed (see Table A-1 in the Appendix).
The year 2010 may not be a representative year to assess the role of financial literacy.
Indeed, during the crisis (as the financial market shrinks and banks reduce markedly
their credit to firms and households) having knowledge of financial instruments may
represent a stronger advantage with respect to what happens during normal years.
Questions concerning financial literacy are included in the SHIW since the 2006 wave.
However, unfortunately only 2 questions are common to all three waves (2006, 2008,
and 2010): the one regarding knowledge of inflation mechanism and the one on different
types of loan repayment schemes. We restrict our analysis to these 2 questions and
estimate our baseline model, including a set of year fixed effects. Results are shown in
table 10 and confirm previous findings. In the SHIW dataset there is a rotating panel
subsample: the specification in the upper panel of table 10 includes these household
several times, as they are interviewed more than once over the three waves. These
households, may, however learn the questions from one interview to the other, and
thus tend to be more likely to answer correctly overtime. At the same time attrition
in the panel subsample tends to be higher among worse-off households (see Biagi et al.
(2009)). The results of both learning and non-random attrition may upwardly bias
our estimate of the effect of financial literacy. We, then, include in the sample only
the first interview made by each households. The comparison between this and the
previous regressions shows that learning has a significant effect: including the first
22We look at various dimensions of heterogeneity, and estimate our baseline model on different
subsamples (see Tables A-3,A-4,A-5 in the Appendix). We find that the impact of financial literacy
is slightly larger for households living in a large city, in northern Italy and where the household head
is a male.
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interview only raises the impact of financial literacy on financial assets by 8 thousand
euros.23
In addition, we can exploit the panel dimension to expand the set of instruments
and perform and overidentification test of the exclusion restriction of our IV approach.
In order to do so, we focus on those households that are sampled both in 2008 and in
2010 and we distinguish four groups among them: those that have remained clients of
PattiChiari over the two years, those that have remained clients of a non-PattiChiari
bank, and two groups of ‘switchers’, i.e., those that have moved from a PattiChiari to
a non-PattiChiari bank, and vice-versa. The four groups identify three instrumental
variables (plus a baseline group). All these variables can be used to predict financial
literacy in 2010. Results are summarized in the first panel of Table 11. The first-
stage shows that there are no significant differences in financial literacy between those
who were clients of PattiChiari since 2008 and remained in this status (the omitted
baseline) and those who switched to a PattiChiari bank during the 2008-2010 period.
Conversely, financial literacy is smaller among those who are not clients of PattiChiari
in 2010. This negative effect is smaller for those who switched to a non-PattiChiari
bank between the two waves of the SHIW with respect to those who were not Pat-
tiChiari clients in 2008. Turning to the ITT estimate, there is a significant difference
in financial assets only between those who did not switch over the 2008-2010 period:
households that remained non-PattiChiari clients have on average almost 7 thousands
euro less with respect to those who remained PattiChiari clients. The IV estimate
of the effect of financial literacy on financial assets is particularly strong: an addi-
tional correct answer increases financial assets by 31 thousands euros. The Hansen J
test does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instruments with a fairly
high p-value (0.22). The lower panel of table 11 replicates the exercise focusing on
bank-switchers over the 2006-2010 period (two waves). Although the sample size is
almost halved, the Hansen J test yields a very high p-value (0.91). The IV estimate
of the causal effect of financial literacy on financial assets is reduced by one third with
respect to the previous estimate: an increase in financial literacy induces a raise of 20
thousands euros in financial assets.
23Recall that: i) the magnitude of the effect is different from the baseline regression because financial
literacy is defined used a different number of questions (2 instead of 3); ii) the same respondents belong
to the samples in the upper and lower panel.
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Finally, we turn to the analysis of the channels that drive the positive effect mea-
sured in the aggregate. We identify three potentially relevant mechanisms that may
explain it: literate respondents may save more (e.g., for retirement), may be more
prone to plan for retirement and, finally, may hold a better-diversified portfolio.24
Table 12 reports the estimate of association (OLS), FS, ITT and IV for the three
outcomes. All the channels seem to be relevant in explaining our findings: answering
correctly to one more questions increases saving by more than 6 thousand euros per
year and increases the likelihood of planning for retirement by 0.27 (roughly 60% of the
sample mean). The marginal effect of financial literacy on the probability of investing,
directly or indirectly, in the stock market is almost 20% (above the sample mean).
7 Concluding remarks
The interests by scholars and policy-makers in Europe and in the US on the determi-
nants of financial literacy and on the link between financial literacy and savings has
been constantly increasing in the last years and some institutions, such as the OECD,
the U.S. Treasury Department and the Bank of Italy, have expressed the need for
improved financial knowledge among European and US citizens, emphasizing the role
of formal financial education in schools or at the workplace.
This research contributes to the investigation of these issues introducing a new and
possibly complementary policy instrument. We start from recognizing the role of banks
information policies as determinant of individuals’ levels of financial literacy. This
channel did not receive much attention in the literature but may play a relevant role
in shaping individual financial knowledge and, thus, it may have impact on household
finances and welfare.
We identify a group of Italian banks that implement active policies aimed at in-
creasing transparency. These are the members of PattiChiari, a banking self-regulation
system that includes around one hundred banks (almost 75% of total Italian branches),
that are not uniformly distributed across Italian regions. These banks undertake sev-
eral commitments in order to guarantee transparency and comparability of financial
products and to offer clients simple tools to clearly understand sophisticated financial
24We exploit, respectively, information about savings, the answer to the questions “Have you ever
thought about how to arrange for your household’s support when you retire?” (not asked to retiree),
and information on asset held (the dummy is one if the respondent own stocks or a mutual funds).
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instruments but do not offer services at lower costs with respect to banks outside the
consortium.
We exploit the SHIW dataset, a survey that provides information on the bank where
the household has its current account and on the household head’s financial literacy,
to assess the impact of bank information policies on individual financial knowledge.
We find that being client of a PattiChiari bank translates into a 0.3 percentage points
increase in financial literacy. We also look at the effect of our instrumental variable
on household financial assets and on various components of it. Results based on our
identification strategy suggest that being client of PattiChiari yields an increase of
household financial assets of around 5 thousand euros. We can rule out that these
effects are driven by differences in the cost of financial services between PattiChiari
banks and banks not in the network.
We then use the variation in financial literacy induced by banks information policies
to assess the role of financial information processing in determining household wealth.
If, conditional on province of residence, individuals self-select into banks not according
to their information policies but rather depending on other relevant variables, such
as the distance between the bank and their residence -as done most frequently in
our sample-, bank’s information policies may provide a valid instrument for financial
literacy in the saving equation and thus allow us to assess the causal effect of financial
knowledge on wealth and portfolio composition accounting for endogeneity. Our results
suggest that the relationship between financial literacy and financial assets is largely
underestimated by OLS regressions.
We investigate the channels through which financial literacy increases financial as-
sets and we show that literate households save more, are more prone to plan for re-
tirement and are more likely to participate, directly or indirectly, to the stock market.
Our findings have relevant policy implications: first, they suggest alternative ways
to improve individuals financial knowledge with respect to formal education in schools
on at the workplace; second, they suggest that the association between financial knowl-
edge and wealth largely underestimates the true causal effect. In addition, we highlight
some of the channels through which this positive effect may take place: we find that
higher financial literacy leads to higher savings, increases in the probability of planning
for retirement and higher participation to the stock market.
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Table 1: Bank Costs by PattiChiari Status - Year 2010 (euro)
Type Basic Debit Credit Avg. Cost Avg. Cost Obs
of Bank Account Card Card Bank Transf. Bank Transf.
Fees Fees Fees (desk) (online)
non-Patti-Chiari 32.5 6.78 16.0 1.76 0.38 2106
(30.0) (5.72) (19.9) (4.61) (3.67)
Patti-Chiari 36.0 4.33 14.6 2.06 0.52 6127
(38.2) (5.24) (13.4) (6.05) (4.59)
Welch t-test stat. 4.22 17.3 (0.00) 3.05 (0.00) 2.39 (0.00) 1.31
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19)
Source: Bank of Italy Survey on Bank Fees and Expenditures. Notes: an observation is an individual bank account. Due to confidentiality
reasons, for each bank, only means and standard deviations of each variable has been provided, together with the number of bank accounts
surveyed. The means and standard deviations provided in this table are, thus, combined assuming observations are independent between
banks. The Welch t-test for equality of means assumes unequal standard deviations between the two groups.
Table 2: Unconfoundedness of PattiChiari Status With Respect To Credit Services -
Probit Regression Results (Coefficients and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Prob. of being Prob. of having Level of Level of
Liq. Constrained a fixed rate mortg. fixed int.rate adj. int.rate
Client of PattiChiari -0.135 -0.150 -0.573 0.433
(0.094) (0.288) (0.764) (1.189)
N 3454 382 124 103
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include a constant, and province dummies, a quadratic polynomial in age of
the household head, dummies for gender and marital status of the household head and for municipality size.
Errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the province level in parentheses.
See Table A-6 in the appendix for the coefficients of the full list of regressors.
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Table 3: Probability of Being a Client of a PattiChiari Bank - Probit Regression
Results (Coefficients, Standard Errors in Parenthesiss And Marginal Effects (At the
Mean of the Independent Variables) in Squared Brackets)
Only 1 services -0.734***
(0.094)
[-0.266]






Convenience + services -0.454***
(0.098)
[-0.156]






Services + bank -0.102
(0.143)
[-0.033]
2 bank’s charact. 0.365
(0.377)
[0.098]
Only fin. reasons -0.635***
(0.089)
[-0.227]
At least one fin. reason -0.557***
(0.065)
[-0.190]
Age 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.034***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
[0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Age sq. -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000]
Male 0.169*** 0.159*** 0.164***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
[0.053] [0.050] [0.051]
Married 0.097* 0.097* 0.106*
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057)
[0.030] [0.031] [0.033]
Nb. hh components 0.050** 0.046* 0.046*
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
[0.016] [0.014] [0.014]
Municip. <20.000 inh. -0.143 -0.147 -0.144
(0.097) (0.098) (0.096)
[-0.045] [-0.047] [-0.046]
Municip. 40.000-500.000 inh. 0.143 0.132 0.149
(0.106) (0.106) (0.107)
[0.044] [0.041] [0.046]
Municip. 500.000+ inh. 0.310*** 0.283*** 0.311***
(0.081) (0.076) (0.083)
[0.087] [0.081] [0.088]
N 4951 4951 4951
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include a constant, and province dummies.
Errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the province level in parentheses; marginal effect in squared
brackets.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Financial Literacy
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 1.926 0.983 4972
Fin. lit. (3/3 correct) 0.34 0.474 4972
Inflation correct 0.74 0.439 4972
Loan correct 0.639 0.48 4972
Portf. div. correct 0.547 0.498 4972
PattiChiari Dummies
pc 0.729 0.445 4972
pc nobnk 0.616 0.486 5885
pc all 0.537 0.499 5885
pc atleast 0.646 0.478 5927
Outcomes
Financial assets 19.128 22.149 4972
Savings 7.933 12.886 4972
Planning for retirement 0.452 0.498 2757
Stock market participation 0.115 0.319 4972
Baseline Controls
Male 0.556 0.497 4972
Age 58.465 15.374 4972
Married 0.636 0.481 4972
Nb. hh components 2.47 1.211 4972
Municip. 20.000-40.000 inh. 0.193 0.395 4972
Municip. 40.000-500.000 inh. 0.446 0.497 4972
Municip. 500.000+ inh. 0.1 0.3 4972
Motivations
Only 1 services 0.066 0.248 4972
Only 1 bank’s charact. 0.023 0.15 4972
2 convenience 0.115 0.319 4972
Convenience + services 0.101 0.301 4972
Convenience + bank 0.103 0.304 4972
2 services 0.027 0.163 4972
Services + bank 0.023 0.151 4972
2 bank’s charact. 0.003 0.053 4972
Additional Controls
High trust 0.561 0.496 4972
Length relat. 3.608 0.820 4972
Years of education 9.44 4.54 4972
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Table 5: Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.759*** 17.464***
(0.679) (2.918)
Client of PattiChiari 0.281*** 4.906***
(0.037) (0.831)
Age 1.107*** 0.048*** 1.244*** 0.408**
(0.135) (0.007) (0.141) (0.198)
Age sq. -0.008*** -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Male 2.038*** 0.208*** 2.668*** -0.960
(0.724) (0.026) (0.721) (0.894)
Married 3.414*** 0.023 3.395*** 2.988***
(0.715) (0.038) (0.747) (0.776)
Nb. hh components 0.548 0.051*** 0.696* -0.203
(0.364) (0.016) (0.355) (0.465)
Municip. 20.000-40.000 inh. -0.181 -0.038 -0.481 0.191
(1.366) (0.071) (1.411) (1.532)
Municip. 40.000-500.000 inh. 1.161 -0.016 0.782 1.062
(1.475) (0.068) (1.410) (1.939)
Municip. 500.000+ inh. 2.625 0.197 2.882 -0.561
(2.500) (0.129) (2.369) (3.735)
Province FE Y Y Y Y
N 4972 4972 4972 4972
Ftest 57.095
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
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Table 6: Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets, Controlling for Reasons
(Baseline Specification)
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.649*** 16.724***
(0.666) (2.710)
Client of PattiChiari 0.296*** 4.953***
(0.039) (0.778)
Age 1.082*** 0.047*** 1.213*** 0.426**
(0.137) (0.007) (0.141) (0.190)
Age sq. -0.008*** -0.000*** -0.009*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Male 2.007*** 0.200*** 2.555*** -0.796
(0.708) (0.026) (0.698) (0.830)
Married 3.429*** 0.021 3.395*** 3.036***
(0.690) (0.037) (0.722) (0.746)
Nb. hh components 0.514 0.050*** 0.645* -0.189
(0.361) (0.017) (0.356) (0.443)
Municip. 20.000-40.000 inh. -0.367 -0.044 -0.692 0.041
(1.366) (0.070) (1.406) (1.521)
Municip. 40.000-500.000 inh. 1.021 -0.025 0.602 1.016
(1.504) (0.067) (1.434) (1.920)
Municip. 500.000+ inh. 2.610 0.191 2.816 -0.373
(2.492) (0.133) (2.395) (3.611)
Only 1 services 1.083 0.089 2.282* 0.801
(1.345) (0.064) (1.339) (1.633)
Only 1 bank’s charact. 2.692 -0.094 2.103 3.684
(2.107) (0.065) (2.081) (2.247)
2 convenience 6.079*** 0.088 6.411*** 4.938***
(1.270) (0.055) (1.316) (1.294)
Convenience + services 1.487 0.151** 2.535** 0.012
(1.245) (0.068) (1.247) (1.569)
Convenience + bank 5.045*** 0.092 5.145*** 3.612**
(1.297) (0.060) (1.300) (1.408)
2 services 4.093** 0.241*** 5.551*** 1.515
(1.873) (0.075) (1.934) (1.943)
Services + bank 2.296 0.167* 3.023 0.222
(2.257) (0.086) (2.208) (2.548)
2 bank’s charact. 4.976 0.065 4.974 3.880
(5.292) (0.172) (5.436) (5.041)
Province FE Y Y Y Y
N 4972 4972 4972 4972
Ftest 58.651
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
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Table 7: Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets, Adding Additional Controls
to the Baseline Specification: Trust, Length of Relation with Bank, Years of Education
OLS FS ITT IV
Additional control: Trust
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.644*** 16.766***
(0.666) (2.797)
Client of PattiChiari 0.301*** 5.051***
(0.039) (0.788)
High trust 0.536 0.053 1.015 0.128
(0.707) (0.042) (0.676) (1.040)
Additional control: Length of Relation with Bank
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.554*** 15.214***
(0.664) (2.727)
Client of PattiChiari 0.287*** 4.364***
(0.040) (0.753)
Length relat. 2.246*** 0.033 2.094*** 1.589**
(0.521) (0.027) (0.518) (0.625)
Additional control: Years of education
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 2.284*** 12.226***
(0.642) (3.438)
Client of PattiChiari 0.229*** 2.797***
(0.035) (0.770)
Years of education 1.411*** 0.046*** 1.479*** 0.914***
(0.094) (0.004) (0.089) (0.214)
Province FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
N 4972 4972 4972 4972
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include the controls in the baseline specification (Table 6).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
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Table 8: Robustness: Different Measures of Financial Literacy of Financial Literacy:
First stage and Instrumental Variable Estimates. Measure of the Instrument is Always
an Indicator of Whether the Main Bank is a PattiChiari Bank pc
Nb. of Correct Indicator for Indicator for Indicator for Indicator for
Answers 3 Answers Inflation Quest. Loan Quest. Portfolio divers.
Out of 3 Correct Out of 3 Correct Correct Quest. Correct
Avg. 1.926 0.34 0.74 0.639 0.547
FS 0.296∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.093 ∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020)
OLS 3.649∗∗∗ 6.456∗∗∗ 4.449∗∗∗ 2.799∗∗∗ 7.700∗∗∗
(0.666) (1.139) (1.304) (0.901) (1.226)
IV 16.724∗∗∗ 73.632∗∗∗ 40.937∗∗∗ 60.169∗∗∗ 53.347∗∗∗
(2.710) (19.293) (7.889) (12.593) (11.470)
F-test 58.651 17.158 36.336 36.727 21.816
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include the controls in the baseline specification (Table 6).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
Table 9: Robustness: Different Measures of the Instrumental Variable: First Stage, In-
tention to Treat and Instrumental Variables Estimates. Measure of Financial Literacy
is Always the Number of Correct Answers Out of 3)
pc pc nobnk pc all pc atleast
Avg. 0.729 0.616 0.537 0.646
FS 0.296∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033)
ITT 4.953∗∗∗ 2.970∗∗∗ 1.163∗ 4.413∗∗∗
(0.778) (0.715) (0.676) (0.647)
IV 16.724∗∗∗ 15.550∗∗∗ 7.688∗ 20.998∗∗∗
(2.710) (3.571) (4.187) (3.821)
F-test 58.651 33.680 23.176 40.910
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include the controls in the baseline specification (Table 6).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
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Table 10: Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets: 2006-2010 sample.
Data: Repeated Cross-Section
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/2) 2.875*** 26.049***
(0.391) (2.738)
Client of PattiChiari 0.209*** 5.440***
(0.019) (0.457)
N 12413 12413 12413 12413
Ftest 123.898
Data: Panel Individuals Only
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/2) 3.126*** 33.936***
(0.553) (6.182)
Client of PattiChiari 0.158*** 5.373***
(0.026) (0.794)
N 5440 5440 5440 5440
Ftest 38.494
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include the controls in the baseline specification (Table 6).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
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Table 11: Association and Causal Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets.
Instrumenting using information on ’bank-switchers’ in two years (between waves)
HHs observed in 2008 and 2010
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/2) 2.890*** 31.410***
(0.717) (6.622)
Switches to Client of PattiChiari -0.073 -1.099
(0.074) (2.109)
Stays Client of Non-PattiChiari -0.190*** -6.824***
(0.042) (0.927)
Switches to Client of Non-PattiChiari -0.136*** -1.609
(0.046) (1.508)
N 3373 3373 3373 3373
Hansen J p-value 0.221
HHs observed in 2006 and 2010
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/2) 2.351* 20.658***
(1.290) (7.141)
Switches to Client of PattiChiari -0.066 -0.155
(0.105) (2.660)
Stays Client of Non-PattiChiari -0.236*** -5.058***
(0.070) (1.447)
Switches to Client of Non-PattiChiari -0.129* -2.035
(0.071) (2.910)
N 1610 1610 1610 1610
Hansen J p-value 0.913
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include the controls in the baseline specification (Table 6).
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses.
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Table 12: Effect of financial literacy on other outcomes
OLS FS ITT IV
Savings
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 0.656** 6.760***
(0.314) (1.613)
Client of PattiChiari 0.297*** 2.006***
(0.038) (0.422)
N 4959 4959 4959 4959
Ftest 59.955
Planning for retirement
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 0.046*** 0.267**
(0.014) (0.112)
Client of PattiChiari 0.239*** 0.064**
(0.048) (0.027)
N 2753 2753 2753 2753
Ftest 24.815
Stock market participation
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 0.033*** 0.191***
Client of PattiChiari 0.297*** 0.057***
(0.038) (0.011)
N 4959 4959 4959 4959
Ftest 59.955
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include the controls in the baseline specification (Table 6).




Table A-1: Robustness: Controlling for Municipality Fixed Effects
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.806*** 21.933***
(0.501) (3.640)
Client of PattiChiari 0.263*** 5.763***
(0.037) (0.736)
Age 1.099*** 0.053*** 1.235*** 0.079
(0.139) (0.006) (0.140) (0.245)
Age sq. -0.008*** -0.001*** -0.009*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Male 1.920*** 0.175*** 2.390*** -1.441
(0.666) (0.031) (0.639) (0.958)
Married 3.703*** 0.008 3.592*** 3.415***
(0.672) (0.038) (0.708) (0.868)
Nb. hh components -0.166 0.053*** 0.016 -1.139**
(0.387) (0.017) (0.392) (0.503)
Municip. 20.000-40.000 inh. 2.070 -0.111 1.472 3.896*
(1.640) (0.098) (1.710) (2.337)
Municip. 40.000-500.000 inh. -0.464 -0.079 -1.011 0.719
(1.356) (0.071) (1.415) (1.616)
Municip. 500.000+ inh. -5.195 0.348 -4.744 -12.373**
(3.361) (0.289) (3.364) (6.299)
Only 1 services 0.931 0.072 2.298* 0.717
(1.305) (0.075) (1.297) (1.957)
Only 1 bank’s charact. 0.725 -0.039 0.329 1.178
(1.967) (0.076) (1.947) (2.418)
2 convenience 5.793*** 0.057 6.088*** 4.841***
(1.087) (0.054) (1.120) (1.345)
Convenience + services 2.565* 0.118* 3.522*** 0.925
(1.300) (0.071) (1.281) (1.829)
Convenience + bank 5.265*** 0.056 5.120*** 3.898**
(1.275) (0.053) (1.274) (1.559)
2 services 4.510** 0.219*** 5.910*** 1.114
(1.859) (0.082) (1.884) (2.244)
Services + bank 2.268 0.187** 2.900 -1.194
(2.464) (0.082) (2.394) (2.842)
2 bank’s charact. 8.498 0.058 8.187 6.922
(5.361) (0.151) (5.410) (6.055)
N 4969 4969 4969 4969
Ftest 49.640
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include a constant, and municipality dummies.
Errors robust to heteroskedasticity or clustered at the province level in parentheses; marginal effect in squared brackets.
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Table A-2: Robustness: Different Measures of the Instrumental Variable Over Time
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.522*** 18.964***
(0.792) (4.322)




Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.431*** 21.431***
(0.890) (7.563)
Client of PattiChiari in 2006 0.225*** 4.823***
(0.075) (1.249)
N 1952
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include the controls in the baseline specification.
Errors robust to heteroskedasticity or clustered at the province level in parentheses.
Table A-3: Association and Causal Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets.
2010 subsamples.
Household living in urban areas
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/2) 3.650*** 17.296***
(0.735) (3.150)
Client of PattiChiari 0.292*** 5.057***
(0.044) (0.918)
N 4333 4333 4333 4333
Ftest 45.102
Household living in municipalities below 40.000 inhabitants
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.701*** 12.167***
(0.757) (3.093)
Client of PattiChiari 0.306*** 3.722***
(0.057) (0.984)
N 2258 2258 2258 2258
Ftest 29.166
Household living in municipalities above 40.000 inhabitants
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.967*** 21.654***
(0.932) (4.789)
Client of PattiChiari 0.272*** 5.890***
(0.055) (1.070)
N 2714 2714 2714 2714
Ftest 24.608
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Table A-4: Association and Causal Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets.
2010 subsamples.
Households in which the household head is female
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.338*** 12.921***
(0.736) (2.590)
Client of PattiChiari 0.348*** 4.501***
N 2208 2208 2208 2208
Ftest 40.878
Households in which the household head is male
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.841*** 20.009***
(0.775) (5.564)
Client of PattiChiari 0.248*** 4.965***
(0.050) (1.054)
N 2764.000 2764.000 2764.000 2764.000
Ftest 24.403
Households living in Northern Italy
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.523*** 20.166***
(1.203) (5.798)
Client of PattiChiari 0.268*** 5.395***
(0.073) (1.505)
N 2311 2311 2311 2311.
Ftest 13.514
Households living in Central Italy
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 4.865*** 16.576***
(1.064) (4.197)
Client of PattiChiari 0.326*** 5.396***
(0.071) (1.266)
N 1094 1094 1094 1094
Ftest 20.939
Households living in Southern Italy
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 2.930*** 15.251***
(0.618) (4.581)
Client of PattiChiari 0.265*** 4.044***
(0.052) (1.003)
1567 1567 1567 1567
Ftest 26.124
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Table A-5: Association and Causal Effect of Financial Literacy on Financial Assets.
2010 subsamples.
Households not working in agriculture
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.410*** 16.015***
(0.689) (2.721)
Client of PattiChiari 0.295*** 4.723***
(0.039) (0.792)
N 4677 4677 4677 4677
Ftest 56.605
26.124
Households not working in financial sector
OLS FS ITT IV
Fin. lit. (nb. correct/3) 3.413*** 16.239***
(0.677) (2.707)
Client of PattiChiari 0.285*** 4.623***
(0.039) (0.763)
N 4710 4710 4710 4710
Ftest 52.920
Table A-6: Unconfoundedness of PattiChiari Status with Respect to Credit Services -
Probit Regression Results (Coefficients and Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Prob. of being Prob. of having Level of Level of
Liq. Constrained a fixed rate mortg. fixed int.rate adj. int.rate
Client of PattiChiari -0.135 -0.150 -0.573 0.433
(0.094) (0.288) (0.764) (1.189)
Age 0.027 0.071 0.198 0.124
(0.021) (0.054) (0.231) (0.087)
Age sq. -0.000*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Male 0.131* -0.099 -0.515 -0.133
(0.075) (0.179) (0.567) (0.833)
Married -0.404*** 0.048 -0.445 0.157
(0.110) (0.265) (0.627) (0.672)
Nb. hh components 0.110** 0.001 0.212 -0.149
(0.043) (0.101) (0.175) (0.354)
Municip. 20.000-40.000 inh. 0.041 -0.068 -0.880* -0.766
(0.160) (0.233) (0.519) (1.015)
Municip. 40.000-500.000 inh. -0.011 -0.145 -0.739 -1.037
(0.144) (0.234) (0.634) (0.929)
Municip. 500.000+ inh. -0.137 -0.414** -0.104 -1.507
(0.291) (0.203) (0.913) (1.860)
N 3454 382 124 103
Notes: ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All regressions include a constant, and province dummies.
Errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the province level in parentheses; marginal effect in squared brackets.
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